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Abstract 
This study examines the combined impact of the 2008 financial crisis and audit 
quality on earnings quality in EU listed firms. Our sample includes data from 14 European 
listed firms over the period from 2006 to 2016, covering the period before, during and 
after the crisis. The absolute value of discretionary accruals is used as a proxy of earnings 
quality by using the Kothari et al. (2005) model.  
We find that firms present higher earnings quality in the crisis period than in the 
previous period. In addition, empirical evidence shows better earnings quality in the post-
crisis period relative to the crisis period. Overall, we find that earnings quality after the 
crisis is even better than before the crisis.  
Furthermore, our results support the argument that Big 4 audit firms constrain 
earnings management more than non-Big 4 auditors. However, a relevant finding is that 
the differential impact of Big 4 auditors relative to non-Big4 on constraining earnings 
management practices decreases over the analysis period. It appears that non-Big 4 auditors 
have enhanced their practices during the financial crisis, so that the differential impact of 
two types of auditors becomes apparently no significant in the post-crisis period.  
We conduct a number of robustness tests either by using signed discretionary 
accruals or by running our tests based alternative subsamples.  
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1. Introduction 
The financial statements are of high importance for several stakeholders since they 
are the main source of information and the basis of the decision-making process 
(Kousenidis et al., 2013). Auditors play an important role in ensuring the quality of 
financial reporting, helping investors to take more informed decisions. However, in recent 
years, both earnings quality and the role of the auditors have been questioned with the 
emergence of the most recent financial crisis of 2008. In this research, we investigate the 
joint impact of 2008 financial crisis and audit quality on earnings quality in EU listed firms. 
Previous studies provide empirical evidence of the effect of the recent financial crisis 
on the financial reporting strategy (e.g. Arthur et al. (2015); Filip and Raffournier (2014); 
Iatridis and Dimitras (2013); Kousenidis et al. (2013); Persakis and Iatridis (2015)). The 
financial crisis implies that firms face increased difficulties, lower and more volatile 
earnings, poor performance, financial problems and also a lack of investor confidence. 
Given this scenario, managers can be led to manage earnings as a way to mask the negative 
effects of the financial crisis. However, the financial crisis may also have a positive effect by 
encouraging managers to increase the transparency of financial reporting in order to 
increase investor confidence and attract potential investors.  
Also, as a result of the financial crisis, many financial institutions went bankrupt and 
they were not provided adequate warning beforehand by auditors, particularly the Big 4 
(Shahzad et al., 2018). Being the Big 4 auditors considered auditors who provide high-
quality audit services thus ensuring the quality of financial reporting, it is important to note 
whether audit differentiation between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors remains in the presence 
of adverse economic conditions.  
Therefore, following the study of Arthur et al. (2015), we analyse the impact of the 
financial crisis on earnings quality in 14 EU countries. However, this study goes a little 
further than the study of Arthur et al. (2015) and other studies that analyse the impact of 
the crisis in European Union. This research analyses not only the period before and during 
the financial crisis but also the period after the crisis, which is a limitation and a suggestion 
for future research in some studies (e.g. Arthur et al. (2015); Persakis and Iatridis (2015)); 
and also analyses the impact of audit quality on earnings quality during these different 
periods of analysis (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis).  
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Since the beginning of the financial crisis the European Union has developed 
substantial efforts to minimize its effects and to prevent potential future crises. Then, as a 
result of the implementation of various measures, a stronger and more capable European 
Union is foreseen, which leads us to expect a higher earnings quality after the crisis than 
before and a higher audit quality.  
To perform our analysis, we collect data from listed firms in 14 European countries 
over the period from 2006 to 2016. Therefore, the magnitude of discretionary accruals 
(measured using the estimated residuals from Kothari et al. (2005) model) is used as a 
proxy of earnings quality since they capture the management discretion. Our findings 
indicate an earnings quality improvement during the financial crisis period comparing with 
the pre-crisis period, suggesting that managers had incentives to improve earnings quality 
in order to increase investor confidence and to attract potential investors. Moreover, we 
also report that during the post-crisis period, the earnings quality was even greater than it 
had been in the crisis period. Overall, the earnings quality was higher in the post-crisis 
period than in the pre-crisis period. This result may be due to the various measures 
implemented in the EU to combat and prevent future crises. Regarding to the impact of 
audit quality, the firms audited by one of the Big 4 exhibit higher earnings quality when 
compared to firms with non-Big 4 auditors.  However, in the post-crisis period there is no 
significant difference in quality provided by Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors. This may be the 
result of improved auditing practices by non-Big 4 auditors due to the implementation of 
various audit-level measures in the EU. Our results are partially robust after taking into 
account the sign of discretionary accruals and for two alternative subsamples.  
This research contributes to the prior literature in several ways. First, the fact of 
analysing the earnings quality during an economic downturn, a period of non-normal 
economic conditions, is already a contribution to previous literature on earnings quality. 
Secondly, our analysis is done for a large sample of listed firms from 14 European Union 
countries.  Thirdly, this study extends the previous research on earnings quality during the 
crisis using a long time period of analysis (from 2006 to 2016) which allows us to analyse 
the periods before, during and after the crisis. According to my knowledge, there is no 
research that does this analysis for the periods before, during and after the financial crisis in 
European Union. Prior literature only analyses the crisis period comparatively with the pre-
crisis period, or they are carried out in the Asian context. Finally, in conjunction with the 
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analysis of the impact of the financial crisis, we also examine the impact of audit quality on 
earnings quality and whether audit quality differentiation remains over the period of 
analysis, which involves macroeconomic changes such as the 2008 financial crisis.  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follow. The next section displays a 
brief literature review of earnings quality, audit quality and the impact of financial crisis on 
earnings quality, as well as the hypotheses development. Next, in Section 3 are presented 
the variables definition and the empirical models used to analyse the research hypotheses. 
Section 4 describes the sample selection process and the descriptive statistics. 
Subsequently, Section 5 initially presents the descriptive analysis and correlation matrix, and 
then the regression results are presented and discussed, as well as the robustness tests. To 
finalise, Section 6 presents the conclusions of the study. 
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2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
2.1. Earnings Quality 
In recent years, financial information and, specifically, earnings quality has received 
more and more attention from investors, creditors, regulators and researchers in different 
areas. Financial statements play an important role for several users since they are the main 
source of information for firm stakeholders1. They provide users the relevant information 
to facilitate their decision making process (Kousenidis et al., 2013). Earnings are often used 
as a summary measure of the firms’ financial performance for contracting, evaluating and 
monitoring purposes, and for investment decision making (Dechow, 1994; Schipper & 
Vincent, 2003). For instance, accounting earnings are used in debt covenants, capital raising 
and executive remuneration contracts (Ghazali et al., 2015).  Therefore, it is in the interest 
of the stakeholders and the firms themselves to have a high quality financial statements, 
since they allow better performing firms to distinguish themselves from the others, they 
help to better resources allocation and decision-making process (Healy & Wahlen, 1999).  
However, accounting literature does not provide an explicit way to define earnings 
quality. Dechow and Schrand (2004) consider high-quality earnings as those that accurately 
reflect the firm’s current performance, that are a good indicator of future performance and 
accurately reflect the intrinsic value of the firm. Similarly,  Dechow et al. (2010) define 
high-quality earnings as providing more information about the component of firm’s 
performance that is more important for the decision-making process. According to 
Kousenidis et al. (2013), high quality earnings allows users of financial statements to make 
more efficient decisions and less risky in periods of financial turmoil, when there is greater 
market volatility.  
Prior literature has also documented general evidence that earnings management 
erode earnings quality (Arthur et al., 2015; Healy & Wahlen, 1999), as it increases earnings 
opacity and information risk (Lin et al., 2014). According to Schipper (1989) earnings 
management is defined as the intentional intervention in the financial reporting process in 
an attempt to obtain some advantage from them. Similarly, for Healy and Wahlen (1999), 
earnings managements occurs when managers use their judgment to change financial 
                                                 
1 According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), stakeholders are capital providers, regulators, bond-rating agencies, 
financial analysts, auditors, employers, suppliers and customers.  
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reporting  either to mislead stakeholders about the true performance of the firm or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on the information presented in the financial 
statements. Then, we assume that the decrease in earnings quality is a consequence of the 
earnings management.  
Firms’ managers are responsible for preparing and disclosing accounting 
information, thereby benefiting from privileged knowledge about the firm. Given 
information asymmetry and the conflict of interests between insiders (managers and 
controlling owners) and stakeholders, managers have the chance to prepare financial 
information in the most beneficial way for them, to the detriment of the interests of 
external users (Ghazali et al., 2015). For instance, managers can use their discretion in 
preparing financial reports to exaggerate earnings and cover losses or, understate earnings 
in years of good performance, creating reserves for periods in the future in order to mask 
the variability of earnings and avoid outsider interference (Leuz et al., 2003). 
Managers have several incentives to manipulate earnings. However, the effect of 
these different incentives on earnings has not a specific pattern (Iatridis & Dimitras, 2013).  
Some firms use income-increasing earnings management to avoid debt-covenant violation. 
If they are violated, the firm can see the interest rate being raised or the immediate 
repayment being required (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Healy & Wahlen, 1999). The 
earnings-based compensation of managers is also pointed out as one of the reasons for 
them to engage in earnings management (Healy, 1985; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1990).  Moreover, firms may manipulate earnings to meet or beat analysts’ 
expectations (Khaled, 2005; Persakis & Iatridis, 2015) or to influence the stock price (Healy 
& Wahlen, 1999). Adversely, some firms may have incentives to use income-reducing 
earnings management, including minimizing political costs related with being too profitable 
(Khaled, 2005), reducing taxes payment and to obtain benefits either from the government 
or the industry (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). 
2.1.1. Measuring Earnings Quality  
There is no generally accepted measure for the earnings quality, however a variety of 
proxies have been developed in recent years (Khaled, 2005). Francis et al. (2004) classify 
earnings quality measures in two groups: accounting-based measures - accrual quality, 
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predictability, persistence and smoothness, and capital market-based measures - 
conservatism, timeliness and value relevance (Kousenidis et al., 2013). 
A large part of the existing literature focused on accruals-based measures to study 
earnings quality. Earnings are composed of two components, total accruals and cash flows 
from operations. Total accruals are accounting adjustments to the firm's cash flows and can 
result from management discretion or from changes in a firm’s economic environment 
(Healy, 1985). The main purpose of these accruals-based models is to separate total 
accruals in discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. Basically, non-discretionary 
accruals, also known as normal accruals, are related to the normal performance of the 
company. Meanwhile, the other portion of total accruals is discretionary accruals, or 
abnormal accruals, which capture the distortions induced by the application of accounting 
standards or by intentional intervention of managers to manipulate earnings (Dechow et 
al., 2010). A high level of discretionary accruals implies higher opportunity of earnings 
management and in consequence lower earnings quality (Bing et al 2014). Discretionary 
accruals are used as earnings management measure and they’re defined as total accruals 
minus estimated non-discretionary accruals, where the latter can be derived from 
discretionary accruals models widely used in prior studies (for example, (Dechow & 
Dichev, 2002; Dechow et al., 1995; Francis et al., 2005; Jones, 1991; Kothari et al., 2005). 
Thus, discretionary accruals are estimated as the residuals from these cross-sectional 
models (Arthur et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2010).  
In her approach, Jones (1991) used the discretionary accruals to measure earnings 
manipulation, where the changes in total accruals are due exclusively to changes in 
discretionary accruals, because non-discretionary accruals remain constant. Jones (1991) 
defines the accrual process as a function of revenues and PPE (property, plant, and 
equipment). Revenues are used to control changes in the company's economic 
environment because they are an objective measure of company’s operations before 
manipulations and PPE to control total accruals related to non-discretionary depreciation 
expense. However, the Jones model assumes that all changes of revenues are non-
discretionary (i.e., they are not manipulated). In an attempt to overcome this limitation, 
Dechow et al. (1995) assumes that all changes in credit sales  are resulted from earnings 
management. Thus, changes in revenues are adjusted for changes in receivables. In turn, 
Kothari et al. (2005) argue that discretionary accruals models might be misspecified when 
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applied to samples of firms with performance out of the normal. In this way, they suggest 
that performance-matched discretionary accruals capture better earnings management than 
traditional models. As such, they included the return on asset (ROA) variable to control the 
impact of performance on estimated discretionary accruals. In this sense, the model used in 
this study to determine earnings quality is the modified Jones model with control for 
performance from Kothari et al. (2005). 
From another perspective, Dechow and Dichev (2002) developed a measure of the 
accruals quality based on past, present and future cash flows. According to the authors, 
accruals quality is measured through the working capital equation error, where a higher 
standard deviation of the residues means lower earnings quality. However, Francis et al. 
(2005) modified Dechow and Dichev model by including the change in revenues and the 
PPE as explanatory variables and to distinguish between accruals quality driven by 
economic fundamentals (innate component of accruals quality) versus management choices 
(discretionary component of accruals quality). 
2.2. Financial Crisis and Earnings Quality  
According to prior literature about the impact of the 2008 financial crisis2 on 
earnings quality in the EU context, it is noted that financial crisis had a significant impact 
on firm’s financial reporting strategy. A period of economic recession is usually 
characterized as a period of economic turbulence; where market uncertainty is greater than 
in normal economic periods, investor confidence decreases, firms experience a poor 
performance and several financial distresses, and earnings tend to be more volatile, to show 
a decreasing pattern and to incorporate more losses (Kousenidis et al., 2013). Nevertheless, 
the effect of the financial crisis on earnings quality is unclear. Some studies argue that, in 
such periods, firms have more incentives to increase the quality of financial reporting, e.g. 
to enhance investor confidence or due to increasing monitoring. On the other hand, it is 
argued that firms have incentives to manipulate their earnings during this period in an 
attempt to mask the negative effects of the crisis, perhaps because of their worst financial 
                                                 
2 The financial crisis began in 2007 in the USA, but only in 2008 reached its peak with the failure of several 
financial institutions (Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Washington Mutual, 
Wachovia, Citigroup and AIG). However, the consequences of the crisis began to be felt in Europe mainly in 
2008 (Filip & Raffournier, 2014). As such, the period 2006-2007 is considered pre-crisis period, 2008-2012 
the crisis period and 2013-2016 the post-crisis period. 
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performance, lower earnings and share price (Arthur et al., 2015; Filip & Raffournier, 
2014). 
Some studies, such as those of Iatridis and Dimitras (2013), found a decrease in the 
quality of financial reporting during periods of economic recession. These authors 
investigated how the financial crisis affected the earnings management and the value 
relevance of financial reported earnings for listed firms that are audited by a Big 4. The 
study focused on the five European countries most affected by the crisis: Portugal, Ireland, 
Italy, Greece and Spain. The authors found that Portugal, Italy and Greece engaged more 
in earnings management in the crisis period than in pre-crisis period perhaps to improve 
their low profitability, and accommodate their higher debt and growth. 
Persakis and Iatridis (2015) also investigated the impact of the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis on the earnings quality in listed firms in advanced countries according to the level of 
investor protection. They used several approaches to measure the earnings quality: accruals 
quality, conservatism, value relevance, persistence, predictability, loss avoidance, and 
smoothness. The results also indicate a decrease in earnings quality during the financial 
crisis, being more evident in the countries with weaker shareholder protection. Also 
Rusmin et al. (2013), in the context of Asian financial crisis, provide evidence of an 
increase of earnings management which suggest that managers opportunistically smooth 
income to beat earnings targets in Asian transport firms.  
However, on the other hand, prior literature also indicates a possible increase in the 
quality of financial reporting during financial crisis periods. For instance, Arthur et al. 
(2015) investigated earnings quality of listed firms in 14 European countries from 2005 to 
2010. They found that earnings quality was higher during financial crisis period (2008-
2010), suggesting that financial crisis motivates managers to enhance earnings quality in an 
attempt to boost investor confidence3 and reduce the negative impact of the economic 
downturn. Similarly, Cimini (2015) examined how 2008 financial crisis affected 
misrepresentation of financial information due to earnings management. The analysis is 
focused on listed firms from 15 European countries. The results suggest a decrease of 
earnings management during financial crisis, possibly due to the requirement of high-
                                                 
3 During a financial crisis, the investor confidence is lower causing market illiquidity. In attempt to restore 
investor confidence, firms are encouraged to provide reliable financial statements, reducing information 
asymmetry and improving market liquidity (Arthur et al., 2015).  
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quality financial reporting to attract potential investors and the high audit quality required 
during this period.  
Filip and Raffournier (2014) also documented a significant decrease in earnings 
smoothing and an enhancement of accruals quality during the crisis period which means a 
decrease in earnings management in European-listed firms. They justify this decrease with 
the lower incentives that managers may have in crisis periods due to a greater market 
tolerance for poor performance, the increased litigation risk during these periods which 
deter insiders to manage earnings; and due the greater demand for more timely earnings in 
these periods. 
Likewise, Kousenidis et al. (2013) analysed the impact of recent crisis in the EU on 
earnings quality of listed firms in countries with weak fiscal sustainability (Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain). Value relevance, conditional conservatism, smoothness, earnings 
management, persistence, timeliness and predictability were analysed as attributes of the 
earnings quality. The results indicate a higher quality of earnings during the crisis period 
because firms that face liquidity problems and depend on external financing have 
incentives to improve earnings as a way to attract potential investors. Furthermore, and in 
the context of the Asian crisis, Chia et al. (2007) report that Singapore companies engage in 
less earnings management during the crisis period. 
To sum it up, financial crisis is an uncommon event where firms have poor 
performance, lower and more volatile earnings and they are faced with big financial needs 
for liquidity which is scarcer in these periods due to lack of confidence of investors (Arthur 
et al., 2015). This might encourages firms to increase their earnings quality as a signal to 
attract potential investors and obtain external financing (Kousenidis et al., 2013). Another 
reason is the increasing monitoring by creditors, auditors and others stakeholders during 
the crisis which pressure managers to reduce the level of earnings management (Chia et al., 
2007). Moreover, as during the crisis poor performances are already expected, the market is 
more predisposed to tolerate this worse performance, and hence reducing firm’s incentives 
to manage earnings (Arthur et al., 2015; Filip & Raffournier, 2014). Lastly, if managers are 
concerned with investor confidence, they will have incentives to provide more credible and 
transparent financial reports, thus reducing information asymmetry and improving investor 
confidence (Arthur et al., 2015).   
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Thus, based on all these reasons documented in the previous literature regarding the 
impact of the crisis on earnings before and during the crisis, the first hypothesis is 
formulated as follows:  
H1. Earnings quality is higher during the financial crisis period than during the pre-
crisis period. 
With regard to the post-crisis period, there are not many studies examining earnings 
quality in the European Union. However, there are also some studies that investigate other 
crisis, for instance the Asian crisis of 1997. Vichitsarawong et al. (2010) examine 
conservatism and timeliness of earnings under 1997 Asian financial crisis. They found that 
conservatism and timeliness are low during the crisis period, and are greater in the post-
crisis period (even compared with the pre-crisis period) which might be possible due to the 
implementation of corporate governance reforms to increase transparency of financial 
reporting. In addition, Herrmann et al. (2008) examined conservatism between firms 
audited by Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors during and following the financial crisis period in 
Thailand. Similarly to Vichitsarawong et al. (2010), the authors found an increase in 
conservatism in post-crisis period. Moreover, firms with Big 4 auditors reported more 
conservatively than firms with non-Big 4 auditors, particularly during the crisis period.  
Similar to what happened in Asia, the European Union also introduced some 
measures in response to the financial crisis in order to solve it and prevent other future 
crises. In this sense, new rules have been implemented to regulate the financial sector and 
strengthen the supervisory framework in 2011, for instance, through the establishment of 
the three European supervisory authorities: European Banking Authority (EBA), European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA), contributing to a single rule book for financial regulation in 
Europe; as well as, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) to monitor and detect 
potential threats to financial stability. The EU also created the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) providing financial assistance to countries in financial distress 
(Commission, 2014). In addition, with the onset of the financial crisis several weaknesses in 
corporate governance were revealed (Plan, 2012). Similarly to some Asian countries that 
implemented corporate governance reforms in the post-crisis, as reported in the 
Vichitsarawong et al. (2010) study, the European Commission also adopted an action plan 
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in 2012 to modernize European company law and corporate governance4 (Plan, 2012). This 
action plan aims to increase the level of transparency between companies and their 
shareholders, encourage and facilitate shareholders engagement and support business 
growth and competitiveness by simplifying the cross-border operations of European 
companies (Plan, 2012). Moreover, the financial crisis highlighted doubts about the 
credibility and reliability of the audited financial statements, so that in 2014 new rules5 were 
created to improve statutory audit quality and restore investor confidence in financial 
reporting6.  
Therefore, taking into account these measures implemented in the European Union 
in response to the financial crisis, the second research hypothesis is as follows: 
H2. Earnings quality is higher during the post-crisis period than during the crisis 
period. 
In addition, since the framework before the crisis was not able to respond to the 
financial crisis and several measures have been implemented to combat and prevent future 
crises, the following research hypothesis is proposed: 
H3. Earnings quality is higher during the post-crisis period than during the pre-crisis 
period. 
2.3. Audit Quality and Earnings Quality 
The role of auditors is important in helping investors to make informed decisions 
and improve the integrity of financial markets (Shahzad et al., 2018). Previous studies 
report that auditors, mainly Big 4 auditors, play an important role in the issuance of high 
quality financial reports, but some have questioned this role during the crisis. 
Audit firms are responsible for providing assurance that financial statements reflect 
the fair and true view of the firm’s business situation and to verify if they are fairly stated in 
                                                 
4 Corporate governance defines the relationships between the management, board, shareholders and other 
stakeholders of the firm, minimizes agency conflicts and prevents the wealth expropriation by managers 
(Plan, 2012; Vichitsarawong et al., 2010). Therefore, corporate governance is associated with a higher quality 
of financial reporting process as advocated by Jiang et al. (2008) who has found empirical evidence that when 
corporate governance is lower, firms are more likely to manipulate earnings and, hence, have lower earnings 
quality. 
5 Directive 2014/56/EU and Regulation No 537/2014 
6 Available in: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/company-reporting-and-auditing/auditing-
companies-financial-statements_en. The measures implemented at the audit level will be examined in the next 
subsection. 
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accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. Moreover, the process of 
auditing reduces information risk that the financial statements contain material 
misstatements or misleading information. Thus, it is expected that a better audit quality 
constrains opportunistic earnings managements, adding credibility to the firm’s financial 
statements. Audit services are also requested to reduce asymmetry problems and agency 
conflicts that may arise as a result of potential interest conflicts between management and 
absentee owners. Besides owners, audit services can also be requested by others users, since 
financial information is an important source of support for stakeholders’ decision-making 
(Hope et al., 2012; Lin & Hwang, 2010; Watts et al., 1983).  
The most widely used definition of audit quality has been provided by DeAngelo 
(1981) who defines audit quality as the joint probability that an auditor will both “discover 
a breach in the client's accounting system, and report the breach” (Bing et al., 2014). This 
probability of reporting a breach is considered a measure of auditor’s independence. If 
auditors’ independence is compromised, they will be subject to litigation and disciplinary 
sanctions that could damage their reputation (DeAngelo, 1981). Further DeFond and 
Zhang (2014) define “higher audit quality as greater assurance of high financial reporting 
quality”.  
In addition to the complex issue of defining audit quality, there is also the difficulty 
of how to measure it since there are a large number of the proxies to do it. Lin and Hwang 
(2010) using several attributes of audit quality found that Big 4 auditors, auditor tenure, and 
specialization have a negative relationship with earnings management, as well as auditor 
independence when measured by fee ratio and total fee. Moreover, DeFond and Zhang 
(2014) categorized audit quality measures into input-based proxies and output-based 
proxies. Input-based proxies refer to auditor-specific characteristics such as auditor size 
and industry specialization, and auditor-client contracting features such as audit fees.  On 
the other hand, output based measures refer to material misstatements (restatements and 
AAERs7), auditor communication (going concern opinions), financial reporting quality 
(discretionary accruals, meet/beat earnings targets, accruals quality and conservatism) and 
finally perception-based measures (ERCs8, stock market reaction to audit-related events 
and market reaction, and cost of capital).  
                                                 
7 Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases 
8 Earnings response coefficients 
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Following many other studies we use audit firm size as the proxy for audit quality 
differentiation, since it is argued that there is evidence that a Big 49 audit firm is expected to 
have stronger incentives to provide higher audit quality rather than a non-Big4 (Becker et 
al., 1998; Choi et al., 2010; DeAngelo, 1981; DeFond et al., 2014; Lin & Hwang, 2010; Van 
Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2008). Big 4 auditors are viewed as having more competence due 
to their heavy expenditures on auditor training, facilities and programs which allows them 
to have better available resources (Khurana & Raman, 2004). They are also considered to 
be more independent than smaller audit firms because they have a larger portfolio of 
clients, then the importance of any single client is lower (DeAngelo, 1981). As they are 
subject to litigation and disciplinary sanctions if they compromised their independence, Big 
4 auditors have more incentives to constrain earnings management and, hence, to conduct 
a high-quality audit, given that disciplinary sanctions damage greatly the auditor's reputation 
(DeAngelo, 1981; Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2008). Therefore, Big 4 auditors have 
more incentives to provide high quality audits in attempt to decrease litigation risk and 
protect their brand name reputation.   
However, some studies have made different findings, such as bigger audit firms do 
not necessarily provide higher quality audits in comparison with smaller audit firms. 
Davidson et al. (2005)’s findings do not support a relationship between earnings 
management and the choice of a Big 5 auditor. Lawrence et al. (2011) also found that the 
effects of Big 4 auditors are insignificantly different from those of non-Big 4 auditors. 
Despite these findings, it is widely accepted by the existing literature that Big 4 
auditors, as high quality auditors, constraint more earnings management than non-Big 4. 
For this, we define our fourth hypothesis as: 
H4. Firms with Big 4 auditors exhibit higher earnings quality compared to firms with 
non-Big 4 auditors. 
In addition, it is important to note whether audit quality differentiation varies when 
macroeconomic conditions change (e.g. during the financial crisis), that is, whether better 
quality auditors (Big 4) continue to constrain more the earnings management practices in 
relation to non-Big 4 auditors. 
                                                 
9 The term “Big 4” is used throughout this study to refer to the four largest international audit firms: Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, KPMG e PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
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During periods of economic turmoil as the 2008 financial crisis the role of auditors is 
called into question. Auditors, particularly the Big 4 auditors, are widely criticized by the 
public for not being able to warn the market before the crisis. Several companies, whether 
in the United Kingdom, the USA, Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands, France or 
Switzerland, have reported financial difficulties shortly after having been provided clean 
audit reports by Big 4 audit firms to their clients for those periods (Sikka, 2009). 
A study that analyses the impact of financial crisis may have on audit quality and its 
consequences on earnings quality is the study of Mollik et al. (2013). They investigate the 
effects of audit quality on earnings management in the Australian context during the 
financial crisis. They found that Australian firms engaged more income-decreasing earnings 
management during the financial crisis, but audit quality did not have an impact in 
mitigating this behaviour. Other studies in the literature analyse the impact of the crisis on 
audit quality, but their conclusions are not consensual. For instance, Johl et al. (2003) 
analysed audit quality in the context of Asian crisis. They found that audit quality is 
differently across pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods with greater constraint on 
earnings management evident in post-crisis. Shahzad et al. (2018) investigated whether 
investors perceived the audit quality to have declined during the crisis in US. They found 
evidence of an increase in the information content of earnings announcements during the 
crisis period compared to pre-crisis period. However, this result is not dependent on 
auditors’ size or auditors’ independence. Xu et al. (2013) found an increase in the tendency 
to issue going concern opinions during the crisis period compared with the previous period 
and that Big N auditors responded to the crisis earlier than non-Big N auditors. On 
contrary, Persakis and Iatridis (2016) found a decrease in audit quality during financial crisis 
compared with the pre-financial crisis period. Sikka (2009) found evidence of the collapse 
or bailout of many financial institutions after receiving unqualified audit opinions in crisis 
context, which raises suspicions that auditors are not sufficiently knowledgeable to provide 
independent and objective account of business affairs (Sikka, 2009).  
There have been efforts in the European Union to enhance audit quality since the 
financial crisis. In 2014, the European Commission reform audit legislation through a 
Directive 2014/56/EU and Regulation No 537/2014 in attempt to improve audit quality 
and restore investor confidence in financial information.  The European Commission 
noted a number of shortcomings, notably deficiencies in audit reports, investor doubts 
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about the reliability and credibility of the audited financial statements, the existence of 
familiarity between the management of a company and its auditor, and still of a high 
systematic risk due to the dominance of the Big 4 audit firms. Thus, this new legislation 
aims at enhancing transparency in financial reporting, reinforcing the independence of 
statutory auditors as well as their professional scepticism, making the audit market more 
dynamic and improving the supervision of statutory auditors (Commission, 2016).  
Thus, based on significant evidence presenting an increase in audit quality in the 
context of financial crisis and due to the implementation of some measures to improve 
audit quality, we expect an increase in audit quality of both types of auditors after the crisis. 
However, as Big 4 auditors are already considered high quality auditors compared to non-
Big 4, it is expected a further increase in the case of non-Big 4 auditors (a smaller audit 
quality differentiation between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors). Thus, we propose the 
following research hypothesis:  
H5. Audit quality differentiation decreases after the financial crisis. 
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3. Research Methodology 
This section presents the research design and the econometric models used to 
examine the joint impact of the 2008 financial crisis and audit quality on earnings quality. 
For our empirical tests, we need to use two regression models. First, we present the 
Kothari et al. (2005) model that allows us to calculate the discretionary accruals which are 
the residuals from the estimation of this model. Afterwards, in order to analyse the 
relationship between earnings quality, financial crisis and audit quality, we rely on various 
models, in which the dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
estimated in the first model. Moreover, the description of our variables and the expected 
signal of coefficients are also presented in this section.  
3.1. Variables  
To find evidence on the impact of financial crisis and audit quality on earnings 
quality, we use multivariate regression analysis based on the existing literature. 
The dependent variable of the models, earnings quality (EQ), is measured as the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated with the Kothari et al. (2005) model, as 
explained in the next section. We consider the absolute discretionary accruals because 
earnings management practices can use income-increasing or income-decreasing accruals to 
achieve targets, as explained by Arthur et al. (2015) and Becker et al. (1998). A higher 
magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals means a greater level of earnings management 
and therefore a lower earnings quality (Arthur et al., 2015). Then, EQ has to be analysed as 
an inverse measure of earnings quality.  
As the impact of financial crisis and audit quality on firm’s financial reporting 
strategy might be different for positive and negative discretionary accruals, we additionally 
estimate the models where the dependent variable is replaced by the positive/negative 
discretionary accruals (DA+/-)10.  
Our variables of interest regarding to the impact of financial crisis are CRISIS and 
POST. They are used to test H1, H2 and H3. The variable CRISIS takes the value one for 
observations between 2008 and 2012, and zero otherwise. This variable allows us to 
compare earnings quality between non-crisis period and the crisis-period. In its turn, the 
                                                 
10 These results are reported in the subsection 5.2.1. 
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dummy variable POST is used to compare earnings quality between the pre-crisis and post-
crisis period, and it takes the value one for observations in the post-crisis period, and zero 
otherwise.  
Another variable of interest, BIG4, used to test the hypotheses H4 and H5, takes the 
value one whether the firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor and zero if it is audited by a non-
Big 4. Prior research reports that the level of audit quality has a significant impact on 
earnings management. As Big 4 auditors are more independent (DeAngelo, 1981), have 
more competence due to larger investments on auditor training, facilities and programs 
(Khurana & Raman, 2004) and have more to lose in case of compromising their 
independence, we expect that Big 4 auditors constrain earnings management.  Therefore, 
we expect that firms with Big 4 auditors report higher earnings quality, that is, the 
coefficient on BIG4 has an expected negative signal. 
There are other variables that may influence earnings quality. Thus, following other 
studies (Arthur et al., 2015; Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2008), we include some control 
variables in the model to take into account some effects of firm characteristics that are 
expected to be related to discretionary accruals.  
Following Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008) and Arthur et al. (2015), we use the  
yearly sales growth rate (GROWTH) to control differences in performance, because the 
market penalises growth firms with unexpected adverse earnings (Arthur et al., 2015; 
Skinner & Sloan, 2002). Normally, growth firms are associated with greater information 
asymmetries, so it is expected that they will have more incentives to manage earnings 
(Madhogarhia et al., 2009). Therefore, we expect that high-growth firms report lower-
quality earnings, in other words, we expect the signal of the coefficient of GROWTH to be 
positive. Accrual-based measures of earnings quality capture either the uncertainty of the 
business model or the discretionary choices of managers and Francis et al. (2005) provides 
evidences on the higher impact of business uncertainty, consistent with higher growth 
implying poor earnings quality. 
We also include a size variable (SIZE) defined as natural logarithm of total assets. 
According to Arthur et al. (2015), larger firms are more monitored by the market and, then 
managers have less incentives to manage earnings. Therefore, the expected signal of the 
coefficient is negative because larger firms are negatively associated with discretionary 
accruals.  
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Prior literature argues that highly leveraged firms usually have incentives to engage in 
earnings management practices to avoid debt covenant violations (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 
1994). Conversely, these firms are also highly controlled by debt holders, which represents 
a constraint to the earnings management practices, so they are expected to have more 
incentive to show higher financial reports quality (Arthur et al., 2015; DeFond & 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). Therefore, a leverage variable is also 
included (LEV), given by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, and its signal is not 
predictable.  
Finally, industry and country dummy variables were also included as industry and 
country-fixed effects to control for industry and country differences. Industries are 
classified according to ICB (Industry Classification Benchmark).  
All variable definitions are presented below in Table 1. 
Table 1 - Variable Description 
Variable Definition 
EQ Earnings quality. Absolute value of discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals are the 
residuals from the Kothari et al. (2005) model estimation.  
DA+/- Positive/negative discretionary accruals from the Kothari et al. (2005) model estimation. 
POST Dummy variable; takes the value 1 for observations in the post-crisis period (2013-2016) 
and 0 otherwise. 
CRISIS Dummy variable; takes the value 1 for observations in the crisis period (2008-2012) and 0 
otherwise. 
BIG4 Dummy variable; takes the value 1 if the auditor is a Big Four (Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, PriceWaterHouseCooper, Ernst & Young, KPMG) and 0 otherwise. 
GROWTH Yearly sales growth rate. 
SIZE Natural of logarithm of total assets. 
LEV Leverage; Total liabilities divided by total assets. 
Country Vector of country dummy variables 
Industry Vector of industry dummy variables 
3.2. Empirical Models  
As previously mentioned, discretionary accruals are used as an earnings management 
measure as they capture the management discretion. Therefore, we use the following 
regression model of Kothari et al. (2005), which is based on the modified version of Jones 
model with control for firm performance, to calculate discretionary accruals: 
𝑇𝐴i,t = α0 + α1 (
1
   𝐴i,t-1
) + α2(Δ𝑅𝐸𝑉i,t –  Δ𝑅𝐸𝐶i,t) + α3𝑃𝑃𝐸i,t + α4 𝑅𝑂𝐴i,t +  εi,t                  (1) 
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Where: 
𝑇𝐴i,t - total accruals scaled by lagged total assets for firm i in year t; 
𝐴i,t-1 - lagged total assets for firm i in year t-1; 
Δ𝑅𝐸𝑉i,t - change in revenues (sales) scaled by lagged total assets for firm i; 
Δ𝑅𝐸𝐶i,t - change in accounts receivables scaled by lagged total assets for firm i;  
𝑃𝑃𝐸i,t - net property, plant, and equipment scaled by lagged total assets for firm i;  
𝑅𝑂𝐴i,t - return on assets for firm i in year t;   
εi,t - error term. 
Kothari et al. (2005) argue that discretionary accruals models from Jones (1991) and 
Dechow et al. (1995) are subject to measurement errors when applied to samples of firms 
with extreme performance, in part because discretionary accruals are correlated with 
growth in operating performance. Therefore, Kothari et al. (2005) introduced the variable 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 to the modified version of Jones model to control the performance effect on 
unexpected accruals. The assets as the deflator and the intercept are introduced in the 
model to control for heteroscedasticity in residuals (Kothari et al., 2005).  
The dependent variable of the model is TA (total accruals), calculated as Δ non-cash 
current assets – (Δ current liabilities - Δ current portion of long-term debt) - depreciation 
and amortization, scaled by lagged total assets (Kothari et al., 2005). 
Therefore, discretionary accruals are defined as the residuals from annual cross-
sectional  regressions estimated at the industry level, by using the Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB), with panel data structure and using the OLS (ordinary least squares 
method). Then, their absolute value will be used as the earnings quality measure in the next 
models (2, 3 and 4), which allow us examine our research hypothesis. 
Regarding the impact of financial crisis and audit quality on earnings quality, we use 
three models (2, 3 and 4) that are estimated using a panel data structure and the OLS 
estimation method in EViews10 software. In order to control for heterogeneity across 
industries and countries, we use dummy variables for countries and industries. We do not 
use time fixed effects because we aim at detecting differences between years classified as 
pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis. All variables are defined in Panel A of Table 1.  
20 
 
Regression model (2) is used to test H1 and H2 since it allows us to compare 
earnings quality between the period of non-crisis (before and after the crisis) and the crisis 
period, due to the inclusion of the CRISIS variable. For this purpose, this model is run 
separately during all period of analysis (2006-2016), the pre-crisis and crisis period (2006-
2012) and the crisis and post-crisis period (2008-2016). The dummy variable CRISIS is 
used to examine the difference in earnings quality between each sub period. 
𝐸𝑄i,t = α0 + α1CRISISi,t + α2𝐵𝐼𝐺4i,t + α3𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻i,t + α4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸i,t + α5L𝐸𝑉i,t +
∑Country + ∑Industry + εi,t                                                                                          (2) 
To test H3, the regression model (3) is used since it includes the POST variable that 
allows analysing the differences in earnings quality between the pre and post-crisis period.  
𝐸𝑄i,t = α0 + α1POSTi,t + α2𝐵𝐼𝐺4i,t + α3𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻i,t + α4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸i,t + α5𝐿𝐸𝑉i,t + ∑Country +
∑Industry + εit                                                                                                                (3) 
Both models (2) and (3) also allow us to analyse H4 through the variable BIG4.  
The dependent variable (EQ) is measured as the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals estimated from the residuals obtained from the Kothari et al. (2005) model. The 
independent and control variables are chosen from the previous literature that argue that 
they have a significant impact on earnings quality. 
In addition, in order to test H5, we use regression model (4), without dummies for 
crisis and post-crisis periods. This model is estimated for the three different subperiods 
(pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis) to analyse whether the role of Big 4 auditors in restricting 
earnings management over these three subperiods undergoes some change. 
𝐸𝑄i,t = α0 + α1CRISISi,t + α1𝐵𝐼𝐺4i,t + α2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻i,t + α3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸i,t + α4𝐿𝐸𝑉i,t +
∑Country + ∑Industry + εit                                                                                          (4) 
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4. Sample and Descriptive Statistics  
4.1. Sample 
For the purpose of this study, all data is collected from Thomson DataStream 
database. The initial sample consists of all listed firms in 15 European countries11, over the 
period from 2005 to 201612. Luxembourg is excluded from the sample because of the 
insufficient number of observations. Taking into account that in our model some variables 
require lagged values, we begin collecting data from 2005, which allows us to analyse the 
period from 2006 to 2016. Hence, after applying these initial restrictions we get an initial 
sample composed by 6049 firms. 
Consistent with previous studies (Arthur et al., 2015; Burgstahler et al., 2006; 
Coppens & Peek, 2005; Persakis & Iatridis, 2015; Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2008), and 
in order to increase the comparability between countries, we exclude financial institutions 
such as financial services, banks, insurance and real estate firms and other financial 
institutions because of their specific nature and their different accounting requirements. 
Further, firms with no information about auditor name are also excluded. Finally, firms 
that do not have at least six years of full data are also discarded from our sample. 
Therefore, the final sample includes 2132 firms.  
Table 2 - Sample Construction 
Initial Sample 6049 
Banks, financial services, insurance and real estate firms, other financial 
institutions and firms  
(1363) 
Firms without auditor data (852) 
Firms without at least six years of full data (1702) 
Final Sample 2132 
According to previous studies (Cimini, 2015; Persakis & Iatridis, 2015; Persakis & 
Iatridis, 2016), we consider the years 2008-2012 to define the crisis period. Thus, the 
sample is categorized into three subperiods: pre-crisis (2005-2007), crisis (2008-2012), and 
post-crisis period (2013-2016).  
                                                 
11 Countries that belonged to the EU at the time of all listed firms started to adopt IFRs: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and United Kingdom.  
12 The sample period starts in 2005 because it was when EU began to prepare their financial statements 
according to IFRSs (Regulation 1606/2002) and, ends in 2016 because it is the last year with available 
information in the database at the moment of data collection.  
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Finally, to mitigate potential outlier problems, all our variables (except for the 
dummy variables) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 and Table 4 report the sample composition by country, industry and auditor 
type. As illustrated in Table 3, the sample is mainly composed by firms from the United 
Kingdom (36.77%), Germany (18.53%) and France (12.90%). These three countries 
represent more than half of the firms in the sample, with approximately 68.20%. In turns, 
the least significant countries of the samples are Ireland (1.22%), followed by Portugal 
(1.27%) and Austria (1.36%), making up only 3.85% of the total firms in the sample. In 
terms of auditor type, all Finnish companies are audited by a Big 4 auditor, Sweden is the 
second country with the highest percentage of companies audited by a Big 4 (97.66%), 
followed by the Netherlands (96.36%). Greece has more than half of its firms audited by a 
non-Big 4 auditor (58.70%) and in the United Kingdom that percentage reaches 39.03%.  
Table 3 - Sample Composition by Country and Auditor 
Table 4 provides the firm’s distribution by industry using the ICB (Industry 
Classification Benchmark). The industries with more weight in the sample are Industrials, 
Consumer Services and Consumer Goods, representing 29.22%, 15.81% and 13.79%, 
respectively. The smaller industries are Telecommunications, Utilities and Oil & Gas, with 
approximately 1.64%, 2.72% and 6.10%, respectively.  
Country code Country Frequency % (total) Big4 % (country) Non-Big4 % (country) 
AT Austria 29 1.36% 22 75.86% 7 24.14% 
BE Belgium 52 2.44% 44 84.62% 8 15.38% 
DE Germany 395 18.53% 325 82.28% 70 17.72% 
DK Denmark 58 2.72% 55 94.83% 3 5.17% 
ES Spain 64 3.00% 60 93.75% 4 6.25% 
FI Finland 72 3.38% 72 100.00% 0 0.00% 
FR France 275 12.90% 217 78.91% 58 21.09% 
GB United Kingdom 784 36.77% 478 60.97% 306 39.03% 
GR Greece 46 2.16% 19 41.30% 27 58.70% 
IE Ireland 26 1.22% 24 92.31% 2 7.69% 
IT Italy 121 5.68% 112 92.56% 9 7.44% 
NL Netherland 55 2.58% 53 96.36% 2 3.64% 
PT Portugal 27 1.27% 25 92.59% 2 7.41% 
SE Sweden 128 6.00% 125 97.66% 3 2.34% 
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Table 4 - Sample Composition by Industry and Auditor 
As regards auditor type, the telecommunications industry is the one that has a larger 
percentage of its firms audited by a Big4 auditor (88.57%), followed closely by the utilities 
industry (87.93%). Furthermore, the industry with the highest percentage of firms audited 
by non-Big 4 auditors is the basic materials industry (37.33%), followed by the technology 
industry (32.26%). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry Denomination Frequency % (total) Big4 % (industry) Non-Big4 % (industry) 
1 Oil & Gas 130 6.10% 91 70.00% 39 30.00% 
2 Basic Materials 217 10.18% 136 62.67% 81 37.33% 
3 Industrials 623 29.22% 498 79.94% 125 20.06% 
4 Consumer Goods 294 13.79% 232 78.91% 62 21.09% 
5 Health Care 190 8.91% 156 82.11% 34 17.89% 
6 Consumer Services 337 15.81% 268 79.53% 69 20.47% 
7 Telecommunications 35 1.64% 31 88.57% 4 11.43% 
8 Utilities 58 2.72% 51 87.93% 7 12.07% 
9 Technology 248 11.63% 168 67.74% 80 32.26% 
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5. Empirical Results 
In this chapter the empirical results are presented and discussed. Firstly, we compute 
and analyse some descriptive statistics and then we proceed with the Pearson correlation 
analysis. In the next section we report the results and the regression estimations, as well as, 
additional and robustness tests.  
5.1. Univariate Results 
Table 5 display descriptive statistics of the main variables used in our analysis. Panel 
A indicates several descriptive statistics – the means, medians, maximum and minimum 
values, standard deviation and number of observations - for the full sample. Panel B and C 
show the mean values of earnings quality (EQ), positive and negative discretionary accruals 
(DA+/-) for the pre-crisis (2006-2007), crisis (2008-2012) and post-crisis periods (2013-
2016) and for each auditor type (Big 4 or non-Big 4), respectively.  
As illustrated in Table 5 Panel A, earnings quality reveals a mean of 0.061 which 
suggest that firms may engage in earnings management practices. This finding is consistent 
with Arthur et al. (2015) who found that the mean value of absolute discretionary accruals 
is about 0.065 for a sample similar to ours, but for a different sampling period. Moreover, it 
is also shown that firms that engage in income-decreasing earnings management practices, 
on average, use more discretionary accruals (-0.063) than firms that engage in income-
increasing earnings management (0.059). However, there are more firm-years observations 
in our sample with positive discretionary accruals (9533) than with negative discretionary 
accruals (8923). Regarding to audit quality, a large percentage of firms (76.5%) are audit by 
Big 4 audit firms as opposed to only 23.5% of firms which are audit by a non-Big4 audit 
firms. In relation to control variables, the firms’ size, measured by the natural logarithm of 
total assets has a mean value 12.634. Firms in our sample exhibit a leverage ratio of 52.5%, 
measured by total liabilities/total assets. This means a ratio between equity and total assets 
of 47.5%, consistent with a significant financing with capital equity. Firms also reveal an 
average annual sales growth rate of 11.4%. Panel B of Table 5 demonstrates that with the 
impact of the crisis, the mean value of earnings quality decreases from 0.070 (in pre-crisis 
period) to 0.062 (during the crisis period) and then to 0.056 (after the crisis period), which 
validates the first three research hypotheses. This result means that during the crisis period 
earnings quality is higher representing a decrease in earnings management practices which 
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also occurs in the period following the crisis. Moreover, it is also observed that, on average, 
firms that engage in income-increasing earnings management practices show a greater 
decrease in earnings management over the three periods than firms with income-decreasing 
earnings management. Concerning how audit quality affect earnings quality, the results in 
Panel C appear that, on average, a firm audited by a Big 4 have better earnings quality than 
companies audited by non-Big4, which is consistent with H4. 
Table 5 - Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for full sample 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. Observations 
EQ 0.061 0.037 0 0.582 0.073 18456 
DA+ 0.059 0.036 0 0.582 0.070 9533 
DA- -0.063 -0.038 -0.551 0 0.076 8923 
BIG4 0.765 1 0 1 0.424 25584 
GROWTH 0.114 0.052 -0.833 3.076 0.452 21434 
SIZE 12.634 12.508 7.031 18.375 2.426 24508 
LEV 0.525 0.531 0.019 1.533 0.253 24503 
       
Panel B: Mean values for EQ, DA+ and DA- by period 
 Pre-crisis (2006-2007) Crisis (2008-2012) Post-Crisis (2013-2016) 
EQ 0.070 0.062 0.056 
DA+ 0.070 0.061 0.053 
DA- -0.072 -0.065 -0.059 
    
Panel C: Mean values for EQ, DA+ and DA- by auditor type 
 Big 4 Non-Big 4 
EQ 0,055 0,083 
DA+ 0,053 0,077 
DA- -0,056 -0,090 
Notes: This table summarizes the descriptive statistics for the main variables. Panel A reports the mean, 
median, minimum and maximum values, standard deviation, as well as the total numbers of observations 
for the analysis period 2006-2016. Panel B shows the mean values of EQ, DA+ and DA- for each sub 
period. Panel C shows the mean values of EQ, DA+ and DA- for each auditor type. All variables are 
defined in Table 1. 
 
In addition, it would be interesting to analyse the level of earnings quality by country. 
Table 6 displays the mean values of our dependent variables (EQ, DA+ and DA-) for each 
country. In general, it is verified that Austria is the country with the highest earnings quality 
(the lowest value of discretionary accruals), followed by Ireland. At the opposite extreme, 
we have the United Kingdom, followed by Greece as the countries with the lowest 
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earnings quality. As regards the United Kingdom, one might think that being the United 
Kingdom classified as common-law and with a well-developed financial market, this would 
lead to a better quality of financial information. However, the measures of earnings quality 
are also affected by managers’ incentives, in particular because their remuneration may 
depend on reported results.  
Table 6 – Descriptive Statistics by Country 
Table 7 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between the main variables. We find a 
negative and statistically significant correlation between the audit quality proxy and 
earnings quality, which is consistent with previous literature that high-quality auditors are 
encouraged to constrain earnings management practices. We also find statistically 
significant correlations between the earnings quality measure and firm’s growth (positive), 
firm’s size (negative) and leverage ratio (positive).  
The correlation coefficients between the explanatory variables are generally weak which 
suggests the non-existence of a multicollinearity problem. 
 
 
Country code Country EQ DA+ DA- 
AT Austria 0.044 0.044 -0.045 
BE Belgium 0.056 0.054 -0.058 
DE Germany 0.059 0.057 -0.060 
DK Denmark 0.060 0.054 -0.066 
ES Spain 0.055 0.052 -0.059 
FI Finland 0.054 0.052 -0.055 
FR France 0.050 0.047 -0.052 
GB United Kingdom 0.071 0.068 -0.075 
GR Greece 0.065 0.062 -0.069 
IE Ireland 0.047 0.047 -0.046 
IT Italy 0.055 0.054 -0.055 
NL Netherland 0.051 0.051 -0.050 
PT Portugal 0.057 0.054 -0.061 
SE Sweden 0.057 0.057 -0.057 
Notes: This table provides the mean values of EQ, DA+ and DA- for each country. The variables are 
defined in Table 1. 
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Table 7 - Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
EQ BIG4 GROWTH SIZE LEV 
EQ 1 
   
 
BIG4 -0.160*** 1 
  
 
GROWTH 0.129*** -0.055*** 1 
 
 
SIZE -0.286*** 0.466*** -0.104*** 1  
LEV 0.059*** 0.152*** -0.108*** 0.258*** 1 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The table reports 
the Pearson correlation coefficients. All variables are defined in Table 1.  
5.2. Multivariate Results 
One of the objectives of this study is to analyse how earnings quality varies with the 
impact of financial crisis. In order to analyse this variation in more detail over the three 
subperiods, we run regression model (2) during: a) the whole period of analysis, where the 
dummy variable crisis allows analysing the difference in earnings quality between the non-
crisis and crisis period; b) the pre-crisis and crisis period, to understand how earnings 
quality has changed from a period with normal economic conditions to a period of 
financial depression; and c) during the crisis and post-crisis period. Therefore, a higher 
value of EQ should be interpreted as having a higher level of earnings management and, 
hence, a lower earnings quality (Arthur et al., 2015). 
Table 8 reports the OLS results of the panel data regression model (2). The results 
for the non-crisis and crisis period are presented in Column 1, the pre-crisis and crisis 
period in Column 2, and the crisis and post-crisis period in Column 3.  
Analysing the first column of Table 8, it can be seen that there is no statistically 
significant impact of the financial crisis on the earnings quality. A plausible explanation is 
that the non-crisis period includes two distinct periods (pre and post-crisis periods) and 
then is not possible to say whether earnings quality is better or worse during a period of 
financial depression. Therefore, Columns (2) and (3) show the differences in earnings 
quality between the crisis period and the other periods separately. This may help to 
understand why earnings quality cannot be differentiated for crisis and non-crisis periods. 
Column (2) indicates that CRISIS coefficient is negative and statistically significant at 1% 
(α1=-0.007). This result indicates a decrease in the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
(earnings quality improvement) during a period of economic recession comparing with the 
pre-crisis period, and therefore these findings provide support for the research hypothesis 
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H1. This result is similar to that obtained in Arthur et al. (2015). Column (3) of Table 8 
reports a positive and statistically significant (at 1%) coefficient for CRISIS (α1=0.004) 
which means that the absolute value of discretionary accruals is higher (earnings quality is 
lower) in the crisis period than during the post-crisis period. This implies that from the 
crisis period to the period following the crisis, earnings management has decreased and, 
hence, earnings quality has improved. This result validates the hypothesis H2, which 
supports the notion that the increase in earnings quality after the crisis period may be due 
to the implementation of some measures by the EU in response to the financial crisis to 
solve it and prevent possible crises. 
Table 8 - Regression Results: The Impact of Financial Crisis on Earnings Quality  
EQi.t =α0+α1CRISISi.t+α2BIG4i.t+α3GROWTHi.t+α4SIZEi.t+α5LEVi.t+ΣCountryi.t+ΣIndustryi.t+εit (2) 
Variables   (1)  2006-2016   (2)  2006-2012   (3)  2008-2016 
C 0.158 
(27.430) 
0.164 
(21.093) 
0.158 
(26.335) 
CRISIS 0.001 
(1.022) 
-0.007*** 
(-4.164) 
0.004*** 
(3.464) 
BIG4 -0.005*** 
(-3.554) 
-0.007*** 
(-3.643) 
-0.005*** 
(-3.058) 
GROWTH 0.017*** 
(14.927) 
0.016*** 
(10.780) 
0.015*** 
(11.926) 
SIZE -0.009*** 
(-32.918) 
-0.008*** 
(-23.158) 
-0.009*** 
(-31.942) 
LEV 0.053*** 
(23.402) 
0.052*** 
(16.137) 
0.055*** 
(23.152) 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 17758 10611 15342 
R2 0.122 0.110 0.128 
Adj. R2 0.121 0.107 0.126 
F-statistic 95.169*** 50.057*** 86.139*** 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively and the t-statistics 
may be found in the parentheses. The table shows the OLS results of the panel data regression model (2). 
All variables are defined in Table 1. Column (1) presents the regression results for the whole period of 
analysis (2006-2016), Column (2) for the pre-crisis and crisis period (2006-2012) and Column (3) for the 
crisis and post-crisis period (2008-2016). 
 
In addition, the results for regression (3) with a post-crisis dummy variable to analyse 
the impact of financial crisis on earnings quality between the pre-crisis period (2006-2007) 
and post-crisis period (2013-2016) are present in Table 9. The dummy variable POST takes 
the value of 1 if the sample is in the post-crisis period and 0 otherwise. According to H3, 
we expect a negative signal for the coefficient α1, which means a lower value of earnings 
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management during the post-crisis period compared to pre-crisis period. We find that the 
coefficient of dummy variable POST is negatively and statistically significant at 1% (α1=-
0.010). This means a decrease in the use of discretionary accruals, which indicates a 
decrease in the level of earnings management and, consequently, an increase in earnings 
quality in the post-crisis period than in the pre-crisis period. This result validates H3, 
suggesting that the measures that have been implemented have taken effect. 
Table 9 - Regression Results: Earnings Quality Before and After the Financial Crisis 
EQi,t =α0+α1POSTi,t+α2BIG4i,t+α3GROWTHi,t+α4SIZEi,t+α5LEVi,t+ΣCountryi,t+ΣIndustryi.t+εit (3) 
 Variables EQ T-Stat 
C 0.161 (20.333) 
POST -0.010*** (-6.171) 
BIG4 -0.004** (-2.088) 
GROWTH 0.019*** (12.093) 
SIZE -0.009*** (-24.455) 
LEV 0.052*** (17.288) 
Country Dummies Yes 
 
Industry Dummies Yes 
 
N 9563 
 
R2 0.140 
 
Adj. R2 0.138 
 
F-statistic 59.873*** 
 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, and the t-statistics 
may be found in the last column. The table shows the OLS results of the estimation of panel data regression 
(3) for the pre-crisis (2006-2007) and post-crisis period (2012-2016). All variables are defined in the Table 1.  
To summarize, we find that the earnings quality tends to be higher in the crisis 
period than in the previous period and it is even higher in the post-crisis period relative to 
the crisis period. That is, earnings quality is better in post-crisis period than in the pre-crisis 
period. 
With regard to audit quality, tables 8 and 9 show a coefficient for the BIG4 variable 
negative and statistically significant, which supports H4 that firms audited by a Big 4 
auditor engage less in earnings management in relation to firms audited by a non-Big 4 
auditor. This means that firms audited by a Big 4 present better quality financial reports. 
This result is in line with the findings presented by Arthur et al. (2015) and Van Tendeloo 
and Vanstraelen (2008).  
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Finally, to test H5, the regression model (4) is estimated for each sub period. The 
results are reported in Table 10. The coefficient α1 is interpreted as the differentiated effect 
of Big 4 auditors on earnings quality. It is possible to see that Big 4 auditors during the pre-
crisis period (Column 1) contribute to a greater constraint of earnings management (α1=-
0.010) in relation to non-Big 4 auditors. The impact of this audit quality differentiation 
decreases (α1=-0.006) during the crisis period (Column 2) and after the crisis (Column 3) 
there is no significant difference in quality provided by Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors. This 
result supports the hypothesis that audit quality differentiation decreases after the financial 
crisis and suggests that non-Big 4 auditors develop more competent auditing practices after 
the financial crisis, probably because of the efforts made to improve audit quality in EU 
since the financial crisis.  
Table 10 – The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Quality During the Financial Crisis 
EQi,t = α0 + α1 BIG4 + α2 GROWTHi,t + α3 SIZEi,t + α4 LEVi,t + ΣCountryi,t + ΣIndustryi.t + εit  (4) 
Variables   (1)  2006-2007   (2)  2008-2012 (3)  2013-2016 
C 0.138 
(7.626) 
0.164 
(19.631) 
0.157 
(18.443) 
BIG4 -0.010** 
(-2.182) 
-0.006*** 
(-3.014) 
-0.002 
(-1.138) 
GROWTH 0.023*** 
(7.384) 
0.013*** 
(7.856) 
0.017*** 
(9.079) 
SIZE -0.007*** 
(-8.412) 
-0.008*** 
(-21.842) 
-0.009*** 
(-23.643) 
LEV 0.042*** 
(5.374) 
0.054*** 
(15.619) 
0.055*** 
(17.285) 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 2416 8195 7147 
R2 0.113 0.112 0.152 
Adj. R2 0.103 0.110 0.149 
F-statistic 12.144*** 41.416*** 50.874*** 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively and the t-statistics 
may be found in the parentheses. The table shows the OLS results of the panel data regression model (4). All 
variables are defined in the Table 1. Column (1) presents the regression results for the pre-crisis period, 
Column (2) for the crisis period and Column (3) for the post-crisis period. 
Examining control variables, tables 8 to 10 indicate that the variable GROWTH, that 
aims to control the effect of the firm performance on earnings quality, has positive and 
statistically significant coefficients. This result is consistent with the results obtained by 
Arthur et al. (2015). Looking to firm size variable (SIZE), we find a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient as expected, meaning that larger firms present lower 
levels of discretionary accruals than smaller firms and hence a higher earnings quality. This 
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finding agree with the study of (Arthur et al., 2015), suggesting that market control, which 
is more significant in larger firms, represents an incentive to reduce the earnings 
management. Regarding the variable LEV, it is possible to verify that there is a positive 
relationship between leverage and the magnitude of the absolute discretionary accruals. 
That is, we conclude that high leverage firms experience a lower quality financial reporting. 
which is in line with some studies (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994), that argue that highly 
leveraged firms usually try to engage in earnings management practices to avoid debt 
covenant violations. 
Moreover, it can be observed a statistically significant F-statistic at 1% in table 8, 9 
and 10. This means that the independent variables jointly affect dependent variable (EQ) at 
1% significance level, so the regression models have predictive capability. Additionally, the 
adjusted R2 for the regression models are low (from 0.103 to 0.149), which means that the 
independent variables only explain from 10.3% to 14.9% of variation of absolute value of 
discretionary accruals, respectively. However, these values are in line with those found by 
Arthur et al. (2015). 
5.2.1. Robustness Tests 
To evaluate the robustness of our results, we split our sample into two subsamples 
based on the sign of firms' discretionary accruals (positive or negative), to ascertain 
whether there is a different effect of income-increasing or decreasing earnings management 
(Arthur et al., 2015; Filip & Raffournier, 2014). In this regard, we estimate regression 
models where the dependent variable is replaced by the positive or the negative 
discretionary accruals. This procedure despite being followed by many researchers should 
be analysed with caution because if abnormal accruals are inflated over one period they will 
revert in the following period. The regression results are reported in Tables 11 to 13.  
Table 11 reports the OLS results of the panel data regression model (2) for both 
positive and negative discretionary accruals. Column 1 displays the results for the non-crisis 
and crisis period, Column 2 for the pre-crisis and crisis period, and Column 3 for the crisis 
and post-crisis period. It can be seen that the financial crisis has no statistically significant 
impact (Column 1) on both positive and negative discretionary accruals as previously 
noted. However, when analysing the impact of the financial crisis compared to the period 
before it (Column 2), the results show a statistically significant reduction of (both positive 
and negative) discretionary accruals during the crisis period. This result is also consistent 
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with H1. In relation to the crisis period when compared to the post-crisis period (Column 
3), firms use more discretionary accruals in the crisis period compared to the post-crisis 
period. This is in line with H2 that earnings quality is higher in the post-crisis period than 
during the financial crisis.  
Table 11 - Regression Results: The Impact of Financial Crisis on Positive and Negative 
Discretionary Accruals 
DA+/-i,t =α0+α1CRISISi,t+α2BIG4i,t+α3GROWTHi,t+α4SIZEi,t+α5LEVi,t+ΣCountryi,t+ΣIndustryi,t+εit (2) 
      (1) 2006-2016        (2) 2006-2012       (3) 2008-2016 
Variables DA+ DA- DA+ DA- DA+ DA- 
C 0.148 -0.166 0.152 -0.180 0.150 -0.165 
 
(18.461) (-20.053) (14.466) (-15.084) (17.475) (-19.380) 
CRISIS 0.001 -0.002 -0.007*** 0.006** 0.004*** -0.004** 
 
(0.687) (-1.082) (-3.484) (2.551) (2.807) (-2.537) 
BIG4 -0.003* 0.004*** -0.002 0.014*** -0.004* 0.006*** 
 
(-1.743) (3.542) (-0.721) (4.639) (-1.852) (2.762) 
GROWTH 0.018*** -0.016*** 0.017*** -0.015*** 0.016*** -0.013*** 
 
(12.155) (-9.064) (8.829) (-6.396) (10.195) (-6.750) 
SIZE -0.008*** 0.009*** -0.008*** 0.008*** -0.008*** 0.009*** 
 
(-22.534) (23.331) (-16.197) (16.104) (-21.303) (23.065) 
LEV 0.042*** -0.062*** 0.042*** -0.059*** 0.042*** -0.064*** 
 
(13.018) (-18.975) (9.557) (-12.445) (12.664) (-18.900) 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 9074 8684 5580 5031 7764 7578 
R2 0.109 0.140 0.097 0.130 0.111 0.148 
Adj. R2 0.106 0.137 0.092 0.126 0.108 0.145 
F-statistic 42.471*** 54.205*** 22.847*** 28.785*** 37.250*** 50.283*** 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively and the t-statistics 
may be found in the parentheses. The table shows the OLS results of the panel data regression model (2), 
where the dependent variable is replaced by the positive and negative discretionary accruals. All variables 
are defined in the Table 1. Column (1) presents the regression results for the whole period of analysis 
(2006-2016), Column (2) for the pre-crisis and crisis period (2006-2012) and Column (3) for the crisis and 
post-crisis period (2008-2016). 
 
The OLS results of the panel data regression model (3) are present in Table 12, 
where Column 1 presents it for the subsample with firms with positive discretionary 
accruals and Column 2 for the subsample with firms with negative discretionary accruals. 
The results confirm the previous findings that firms engage in less positive and negative 
earnings management in the period after the financial crisis, supporting H3.  
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Table 12 - Regression Results: Positive and Negative Discretionary Accruals Before and After the 
Financial Crisis 
DA+/-i,t =α0+α1POSTi,t+α2BIG4i,t+α3GROWTHi,t+α4SIZEi,t+α5LEVi,t+ΣCountryi,t+ΣIndustryi.t+εit (3) 
Variables (1) DA+ T-Stat (2) DA- T-Stat 
C 0.153 (13.809) -0.166 (-14.743) 
POST -0.011*** (-5.110) 0.010*** (4.099) 
BIG4       -0.005* (-1.781)        0.004   (1.361) 
GROWTH 0.019*** (9.207) -0.019*** (-7.934) 
SIZE -0.008*** (-17.061) 0.009*** (17.203) 
LEV 0.038*** (8.944) -0.063*** (-14.627) 
Country Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Industry Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
N 4 804 
 
4 759 
 
R2 0.135 
 
0.152 
 
Adj. R2 0.131 
 
0.148 
 
F-statistic 28.777*** 
 
32.727*** 
 
Notes: *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, and the t-statistics 
may be found in the last column. The table shows the OLS results if the panel data regression model (3) 
for the pre-crisis (2006-2007) and post-crisis period (2012-2016). The dependent variables are replaced by 
positive discretionary accruals (Column 1) and negative discretionary accruals (Column 2). All variables are 
defined in the Table 1. 
 
The results for OLS estimation of model (4), with Da+ e Da- as dependent variables, 
are present in Table 13. It is possible to see that during the pre-crisis period (Column 1) 
and during the crisis period (Column 2), Big 4 auditors contribute to a greater constraint of 
income-decreasing earnings management in comparison with non-Big 4, but there is no 
evidence of such audit quality differentiation when auditors are faced with income-
increasing discretionary accruals. The result for after the crisis (Column 3) indicates that 
Big 4 auditors tend to constrain more income-increasing discretionary accruals than non-
Big 4, however this result does not occur for income-decreasing earnings management. 
This leads us to accept the hypothesis H5 that audit quality differentiation decreases after 
the financial crisis, but only in case of income-decreasing earnings management and to 
reject the same hypothesis in case of income-increasing earnings management.  
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Table 13 - The Effect of Audit Quality on Positive and Negative Discretionary Accruals During the 
Financial Crisis 
Da+/Da-i,t = α0 + α1 BIG4 + α2 GROWTHi,t + α3 SIZEi,t + α4 LEVi,t + ΣCountryi,t + ΣIndustryi.t + εit  (4) 
   (1)  2006-2007 (2)  2008-2012 (3)  2013-2016 
Variables Da+ Da- Da+ Da- Da+ Da- 
C 0.125 -0.170 0.153 -0.177 0.153 -0.158 
 
(5.492) (-5.804) (13.215) (-14.531) (12.258) (-13.498) 
BIG4 -0.002 0.022*** -0.002 0.012*** -0.006* -0.001 
 
(-0.388) (3.085) (-0.635) (3.831) (-1.945) (-0.157) 
GROWTH 0.020*** -0.027*** 0.015*** -0.010*** 0.018*** -0.015*** 
 
(5.161) (-5.471) (7.046) (-3.980) (7.401) (-5.447) 
SIZE -0.007*** 0.007*** -0.008*** 0.009*** -0.009*** 0.010*** 
 
(-6.706) (5.117) (-14.750) (15.592) (-16.012) (17.100) 
LEV 0.031*** -0.052*** 0.045*** -0.061*** 0.040*** -0.066*** 
 
(3.132) (-4.254) (9.239) (-12.032) (8.730) (-14.749) 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1310 1106 4270 3925 3494 3653 
R2 0.115 0.144 0.094 0.137 0.145 0.167 
Adj. R2 0.098 0.124 0.089 0.132 0.139 0.162 
F-statistic 6.683*** 7.268*** 17.620*** 24.810*** 23.489*** 29.163*** 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively and the t-statistics 
may be found in the parentheses. The table shows the OLS results of the panel data regression model (4), 
where the dependent variable is replaced by the positive and negative discretionary accruals. All variables 
are defined in the table 1. Column (1) presents the regression results for the pre-crisis, Column (2) for the 
crisis and Column (3) for the post-crisis period. 
 
As a further robustness check, we exclude the United Kingdom from the sample to 
verify whether the results remain robust in the other thirteen countries since the findings 
may be influenced by the most representative country of the sample (the United Kingdom). 
For the sake of brevity, the results are not presented. The robustness test provides support 
for the hypotheses concerning the impact of the financial crisis on earnings quality. 
However, the results about the impact of audit quality on earnings quality are controversial. 
There is no significant evidence of differential audit quality between the Big 4 and non-Big 
4 auditors in the pre-crisis and crisis periods; however, in the post-crisis period Big 4 
auditors constrain less earnings management than non-Big 4.  
As a final robustness test, we estimate the models separately for the United 
Kingdom. The results (not reported) confirm an improvement in earnings quality from pre-
crisis to post-crisis period. However, there is no statistically significant difference in 
earnings quality between the crisis and post-crisis period. Concerning the audit quality, 
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firms audited by a Big 4 have better earnings quality than firms audited by a non-Big 4 after 
the crisis. However, before and during the crisis there is no significant difference between 
the quality of the services provided by Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors. 
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6. Conclusion  
This study aims to ascertain in a combined way the impact of 2008 financial crisis 
and audit quality on earnings quality. This is an important issue as the onset of the financial 
crisis has raised doubts among regulators and investors regarding the quality of the 
financial statements and the services provided by the auditors, notably those of high 
quality, the Big 4. For that purpose, we use the Kothari et al. (2005) model to construct a 
proxy of earnings quality and a sample of listed firms from 14 countries belonging to the 
European Union during the period from 2006 to 2016.  
We find a significant improvement of earnings quality during the financial crisis 
period comparing with the pre-crisis period, suggesting that managers had incentives to 
improve earnings quality in order to increase investor confidence, attract potential investors 
and reduce the negative effects of the crisis. Moreover, we also report that during the post-
crisis period, earnings quality was even better than it had been in the crisis period. Overall, 
the earnings quality was higher in the post-crisis period than in the pre-crisis period. This 
result may be due to the various recovery and crisis prevention measures implemented in 
the EU.  
Further, concerning the impact of audit quality on earnings quality, the results 
confirm the vast findings of previous literature showing that firms audited by one of the 
Big 4 exhibit higher earnings quality when compared to firms followed by non-Big 4 
auditors.  In addition, examining the effect of audit quality differentiation on earnings 
quality over the period of analysis, we found that during the post-crisis period there is no 
evidence of such differentiation between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors in constraining 
earnings management practices. This result suggests that non-Big 4 auditors have enhanced 
their practices during the financial crisis, thus reducing the quality differentiation between 
the two types of auditors.  
Our results are partially robust after running some additional tests by using signed 
discretionary accruals and for two alternative subsamples.  
This research has some limitations. We only use discretionary accruals calculated 
from the Kothari et al. (2005) model as a proxy for earnings quality. Future research could 
use other models to calculate earnings quality, such as conservatism, earnings persistence, 
value relevance, earnings predictability, loss avoidance, earnings smoothness and even 
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other models to calculate discretionary accruals. We also only use the size of the audit firm 
as proxy of audit quality, so this analysis would also be interesting with different proxies of 
audit quality. Moreover, since the existing literature about the earnings quality before, 
during and after the crisis in the EU is scarce, it would be interesting for other studies to 
corroborate our findings. The same applies in relation to the audit quality differentiation 
over these periods. 
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